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Abstract - The current article explains the nature and analyzes 
the status of the pension system in Bulgaria. It distinguishes 
between the positive and negative features arising as an 
aftermath of the reform conducted in 2000. It also outlines the 
prospects for the development of the system in the future.  
 
Index Terms—three-pillar pension system, pension reform 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Bulgaria, the transition from a socialist, centrally-
planned economy to one based on free market principles has 
created a number of financial problems with implications for 
the reproduction of the individual, the collective and society. 
From the very onset of the transition period apprehensions 
have been voiced that addressing the issue of the sustainability 
of the pension system will be protracted and challenging and 
that the price will ultimately be paid by the labour force, 
capital and society. The only questions that remained 
unanswered at the beginning of the transition period were how 
long the process was going to be and what price would society 
pay.  
During the period in question the insurance system operated 
at a loss with a high relative number of pensioners who, 
objectively, are not a productive part of society. Problems in 
relation to their subsistence have occurred and still need to be 
addressed. The anticipated crises have imperatively called for 
creating buffers with a view to ignoring the sharp fluctuations 
in the amount of the funds paid into the insurance system. One 
such buffer was the Silver Fund.  
The transition period put the entire insurance system under 
enormous pressure. The pension system had and continues to 
have a central place and the changes to it were rightly the 
subject of broad social, economic and political debates. In 
general terms, the goal of the system was to objectively raise 
the standard of living of pensioners who make up 26 percent 
of the entire Bulgarian population through a combination of 
mandatory – from the point of view of reproduction security – 
and voluntary pension insurance.  
The appraisal of the changes undertaken during the twenty-
year transition period shows that reforms fall short of the 
expectations of society and the requirements for a functioning 
market economy. Is this so because they were partial in 
nature; were not well thought out; or were not consistently 
applied? Or is the answer a combination of the two? Seeking 
to address these issues led to a large-scale reform, which was  
 
launched in the middle of the ongoing transition period in the  
 
form of expanding the scope and altering the model of the 
pension system.    
In parallel to mandatory state insurance a private insurance 
system was designed and set up, so that the current insurance 
system has three pillars (layers). The first one known as the 
public social insurance pillar has existed for a long time 
having been set up in the period of the centrally-managed 
(planned) economy. That pillar was called on to cover 
approximately two-thirds of pensions. It is essentially based 
on a pay-as-you-go principle. The second pillar, known as the 
additional mandatory pension insurance, was to be based on 
the principle of private accounts. Two funds were set up under 
the second pillar – a Universal Pension Fund (UPF) and a 
Professional Pension Fund (PPF) whose aim was to allow a 
significant amount of capital to accumulate, which would 
cover approximately half of the remaining one-third 
(approximately one-sixth) of pensions. The two funds were 
established in 2001 and 2002. The UPF was set up for the 
younger generation only, born after 31 December 1959 and 
the PPF – for those working in difficult and hazardous 
conditions (approximately 180 000 workers). The other half of 
the remaining one-third will be available only to those 
pensioners, who can afford saving for old age. For this group, 
the third pillar known as the additional voluntary pension 
insurance was set up as far back as 1994, i.e. prior to the 2000 
reform of pension insurance. According to expectations at the 
time the goals of the reform would be achieved over a period 
of 20 to 25 years.  
What were the main results achieved after the recent 
changes in the pension system? 
The answer to these questions should be sought in the 
overall development of the pension system and its constituent 
pillars following the reform undertaken in the year 2000. 
II. THE FIRST PILLAR OF THE PENSION SYSTEM 
A. Positive features of the public pension system 
Regardless of the relatively short period during which it has 
functioned, the following positive trends in the set up and 
management of the mandatory public pension insurance 
system can be highlighted: 
1) Enabling the possibility to make long-term payments into 
a separate fund and defining the precise scope of the 
payments. The removal of the old system of making long -and-
short-term payments into a Public Insurance Fund; 
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THE INCOME SUBSTITUTION INDEX, 2002-2010 [1] 
Year 
Pension paid vs. average 
net monthly insurance 
income 
Pension paid vs. average 
gross monthly insurance 
income 
2002 49.93 39.38 
2003 49.63 39.41 
2004 50.97 40.40 
2005 51.63 40.60 
2006 53.30 42.90 
2007 54.00 43.10 
2008 53.32 41.75 
2009 56.28 44.06 
2010 58.39 46.19 
2) Enabling the possibility to set aside reserves was a 
necessary step towards a transition from a pay-as-you go 
financial arrangement to a pension coverage system. 
3) Adopting the principle of a self-financing fund was a 
necessary condition for viability and stability. As a result, 
achieving a higher substitute level of the average pension per 
retiree as a share of the average national insurance income 
measured through the income substitution index. In the period 
between 2002 and 2010 a stable trend towards an increase of 
the money paid into the fund has been observed. However, it 
should be taken into account that the fund does not fully cover 
the level of substitution because it does not take into account 
the contributions towards the additional mandatory and 
voluntary insurance, respectively. 
4) Ensuring a gradual transition to the new retirement 
system; a relatively gradual increase of the length of service 
and the retirement age in order to mitigate social tension and 
allowing for a gradual adaptation of the workforce to the new 
retirement system. 
5) Adopting the tripartite principle in the management of 
the pension fund through stakeholder involvement in the 
insurance process thereby fostering greater trust in the 
mandatory pension insurance system; 
6) Introducing pension contributions that are covered by 
the insured person 
 According to the adopted model contributions are split 
between the insurers (employers) and the insured (workers 
and employees) in a certain ratio – 75:25 in 2004 and 
increasing by 5 percentage points for the insured each 
subsequent year so that it reached 60:40 in 2009. The 
objective is to ensure the insurance weight is shared equally 
(50:50) between employers and workers in the future as an 
incentive aiming to boost employer investments. 
7) Higher requirements for length of service during which 
insurance contributions are made prior to retirement.  
This is expected to partially offset the negative demographic 
trends in Bulgaria and lower the insurance burden on 
economically active persons. Over the period 2001-2010 a 
trend towards a decrease of the support ratio, also known as 
the pensioner figure, has been observed. 
8) Removing the upper limit of pensions in the long-term 
and tying in the minimum pension to the social pension 
amount. 
 
9) The intended removal of the current ceiling capping the 
maximum insurance income to be replaced by the possibility 
for each worker to pay insurance on the basis of their actual 
income should be seen as a positive development. 
B. Positive and negative results of the pension reform 
What results did the pension reform achieve over this 
relatively short period? A summary is set out below. 
1) Relatively low pensions: in comparison to most countries 
in Europe pensions in Bulgaria are low – in the first decade of 
the 21st century their share of GDP remains below 10 per 
cent. In most economically developed countries, following 
retirement the pension received is two-thirds up to three-
fourths of their income in the last several years prior to 
retirement. In Bulgaria that ratio is about fifty per cent of the 
pre-retirement income. In the last decade a trend towards 
greater dynamics and growth in real terms of the average 
pension per retiree has been observed. However, the rate of 
increase has not been sufficient to raise the standard of living 
of pensions to that of their counterparts in developed 
countries. 
Low pensions are primarily due to the low insurance 
contributions whose level was consistently decreased over the 
last ten years. In 2006 alone the contributions paid into the 
State Pensions Fund was decreased on several occasions.  
Besides the decrease in the amount of pension contributions 
after 2000 the amount of pensions paid was increased and the 
coverage of the pension system was extended. This was 
coupled with higher subsidies for the insurance system from 
the State budget with most funds being paid directly into the 
pension system. In 2009, a part of the subsidy was “legalised” 
as a 12% State budget contribution to the sum total of 
insurance revenue, whist the remaining part remains a subsidy 
proper. These developments have had a destabilizing effect on 
the pension system.  
Fig. 1 [2] shows the continually increasing deficit in the 
Pensions Fund. 
Fig. 1.  Pension fund deficit in the period 2000-2010 
 
A growing rift has occurred between the decrease in 
pension insurance contributions and the sharp increase of 
pensions by the previous governments in power over the 
period in question. It can be reasonably argued that at the 
moment Bulgaria is receiving loans that enable it to continue 
to pay pensions. In the last few years the State budget deficit 
is lower  
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that the deficit in the NII budget. For example, in 2010 when 
State budget deficit stood at BGN 3.684 billion [3], the NII 
received a subsidy of BGN 4.336 billion [4]. Substantially the 
same happened in 2011 when the State budget deficit stood at 
BGN 2.160 [5] and the NII received a subsidy of BGN 3.871 
billion [6]. Had the NII addressed the problems relating to 
early retirement, disability pensions and the low retirement 
age, respectively dealt with the deficit issue, Bulgaria would 
have had a surplus of BGN 652 million in 2010 and BGN 
1.711 billion in 2011. It makes no economic sense to continue 
paying pensions through government loans. In countries like 
Germany, for example, by law debt may only be issued for 
investment purposes and not for the payment of pensions. 
The current government subsidy that makes up the total 
revenue of the pension system exceeds 50 percent. The 
government’s share is primarily funded from tax revenues, 
which form approximately 90% of the State budget – more 
than two-thirds (73.13%) [7] represents the share of indirect 
taxes (VAT, excise and customs duties). The draft 2013 State 
Budget Act retains a very similar share of indirect tax 
revenues – 73.45 percent [8]. In other words, the first pillar is 
currently funded mainly from taxes and insurance 
contributions. This means that pensioners too contribute to the 
pension fund from which their pensions are paid.  
2) The NII no longer enjoys a measure of relative 
independence and is being prepared for privatisation by the 
State. This will render it even more vulnerable to political 
influence and make pensioners dependent on decisions 
underlined by political expedience. This demonstrates that one 
of the major requirements for the pension system – its 
independence as the basis for predictability of the system over 
a relatively long period – has essentially been undermined. 
3) Pension system failures: the adopted points-based 
retirement system has been roundly criticised. Its greatest 
failing is its inadequacy in terms of the choice of a retirement 
date. This can be overcome by abandoning the current system 
according to which the date of retirement is a sum total of 
absolute numbers (length of service in years and length of the 
period during which insurance contributions have been paid) 
and introducing an alternative, which relies on one of two 
criteria – reaching a certain age or actual length of the period 
during which insurance contributions have been paid, which 
will allow a retiree to receive a pension in a rate calculated on 
the basis of the points-based system. 
4) The unnecessarily complex pension calculation system, 
which fails to take into account the income received by the 
insured, respectively insurance contributions paid and 
therefore contribution to the funding of the pension system, 
during their entire working life. This means that in all 
likelihood the calculated pension is not fully realistic;  
4) Low rate of collection of insurance contributions. The 
introduced insurance thresholds partially boosted collection 
but failed to produce a major improvement. In 2010, the 





in 2009. Collected insurance revenue in 2010 was 6.03% 
lower (a shortfall of BGN 213,719.9 thousand) as compared to 
planned annual revenue [9]. The financial stability of the fund 
remains in jeopardy because the decisive factor for stability 
remains the accumulation and maintenance of a considerable 
reserve. There are still many companies, which hire workers 
and employees without an employment contract, i.e. don’t pay 
any or pay social insurance at reduced rates. 
5) In 2002 a possibility was created to receive a social 
pension for disability in addition to another pension. This 
prompted many retirees, particularly those of a more advanced 
age, to request medical certification and hence entitlement to 
that pension. The average number of social pensions for 
disability in 2010 was 492,243 and in 2009 it stood at 
488,334, which represents an increase by 3,909 pensions. The 
average number of social pensions for disability in 2010 stood 
at е 958,947 or slightly less than all pensions paid in Bulgaria 
(The total includes the pensions for disability due to general 
illness or occupational disease, social pensions for disability, 
civil and military pensions). 
III. THE SECOND PILLAR OF THE PENSION SYSTEM 
In the second pillar of the pension system the following 
organisational and managerial arrangements for mandatory 
pension insurance merit a positive appraisal 
A. Positive features of the second pillar 
1) The underlying capital principle, which allows funds to 
accumulate into the individual accounts of future retirees but 
also increase the amount of the funds through investment. 
This will lower the burden for future generations for 
pensioners living at the same time. According to expectations 
the second pillar is to provide approximately 15-20% of 
income from work. 
2) The principle of legal and hence financial independence 
of pension companies and the additional mandatory pension 
funds (occupational and universal). By separating the 
activities of the companies and the funds the interests of the 
insured persons are safeguarded and guaranteed as a matter of 
priority;  
3) The sole object of the company’s activity is pension 
insurance and a prohibition for the company to act as a 
lender. This is also a requirement for obtaining a permit 
(license) for the company and obtaining a court registration 
for the funds. Government regulation is ensured through the 
Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) and representation 
of the interests of the insured through a Board of Trustees. 
4) A direct link between the amounts of revenue received 
from additional mandatory pension insurance and insurance 
income paid and the income from their investment. This link 
and functional dependence between contributions and 
pensions is a personal incentive for the insured to proactively 
provide for their future. 
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5) The insured person can choose whether to pay pension 
insurance into an occupation and/or a universal pension 
funds and the receipt of a pension in case of earlier 
retirement. Retirees are guaranteed the minimum profitability 
from the investments made by pension funds. 
6) The regulation of activities includes a set of rules on 
investing in certain instruments that are allowed to pension 
funds. The underlying objective is guaranteeing the savings of 
the insured and making a profit within the limits of a certain 
diversification of the investment portfolios of pension funds.  
7) The payment of the funds of insured persons into 
individual accounts, which are inviolable, and the possibility 
to receive in case of earlier retirement and the prohibition on 
the use of accumulated funds for any other purposes should be 
appraised as highly positive. 
8) The relatively well diversified insurance portfolios of the 
two funds. 
B. Negative features of the second pillar 
At the same time certain failings in the system for 
additional mandatory pension insurance have stood out, which 
are summarised below. 
1) Relatively low pensions are largely due to the low 
pension contributions, which over the greater part of the 
period was 3% of the insurance income. The rate has now 
been raised to 5%, which is still insufficient. From 1 January 
2017 pension contributions paid into universal funds is set to 
increase by 2 percentage points, i.e. from 5% to 7%. 
The average amount of the funds accumulated in an 
individual account with universal pension fund at the end of 
2011 stood at BGN 1,123.41 and is highly insufficient to 
cover the percentage it will form of the future pension. 
Occupational pension funds are in a situation that is 
essentially the same. At the end of 2011, 247,333 persons 
were paying contributions to them and the net assets of the 
funds stood at BGN 471,129,000 [10]. The average amount 
per insured accumulated with occupational pension funds 
stood at BGN 2,085.52. This coupled with the reasonable 
assumption that future retirees will be receiving pensions over 
longer periods of time, means that the sums in question are 
highly insufficient to cover the intended percentage of the 
future pension. 
At present there are nine licensed pension insurance 
companies in Bulgaria. A breakdown of the average amount 
accumulated per individual in the different funds per gender 
and age is shown on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. 
It is easy to notice that the funds accumulated into the 
accounts of women who typically live longer are less than 
those accumulated into the accounts of men. 
2) Insured persons were attracted without a comprehensive 
awareness and information campaign at a very high cost for 
the private companies. 
3) On average, the insurance culture of the population is 
relatively low. This is due to the ineffective campaign aimed 





Fig 2. The average amount of funds accumulated per insured person in the 
universal pension fund at 30.09.2012 
Fig 3. The average amount of funds accumulated per insured person in the 
occupational pension fund at 30.09.2012 
 
4) The underlying principles of the methodology for 
distribution of insured persons who had failed to choose a 
pension fund following the campaign was incorrect and not in 
line with free market principles. It would have made economic 
sense to deprive large companies of the possibility to insure 
persons on an ex officio basis for a certain period so allow 
smaller ones to reach parity. A similar arrangement was 
introduced in Poland. 
5) The highly complex requirements for licensing pension 
funds remain a problem. 
6) The State should provide support to the persons not 
covered by those subject to mandatory insurance. This group 
covers all individuals born before 31 December 1959 who do 
not pay contributions into a universal fund. This may be 
achieved through a subsidy from the State budget or another 
source. 
IV. THE THIRD PILLAR OF THE PENSION SYSTEM 
The third pillar of the pension system comprises the 
voluntary pension insurance schemes.  
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A. Main features of the third pillar of the pension system 
A summary of the consequent results of the reform is set 
out below:  
1) In the last 17 years 595,287 persons have been paying 
voluntary pension contributions. The net assets in these funds 
stand at BGN 564,724,000 and the average amount of funds 
accumulated per insured is BGN 948.66 [11]. 5,078 persons 
pay voluntary pension contributions under occupational 
schemes with net assets of BGN 3,984,000 and an average 
amount of funds accumulated per person of BGN 784.56 [12]. 
Only one pension scheme operates under this fund.  
A breakdown of the average amount accumulated per 
individual in the different funds per gender and age is shown 
on Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 [13]. 
Fig 4. The average amount of funds accumulated per insured person in the 
voluntary pension fund at 30.09.2012 
Fig 5. The average amount of funds accumulated per insured person of the 
voluntary pensions contributions under occupational schemes at 30.09.2012 
 
The higher amount of funds accumulated in occupational 
schemes under the voluntary pension insurance fund is due to 
women being the majority of the workforce insured under the 
sole occupational scheme operating in the country (that of   
 
 
DSK Bank).  
The results achieved are primarily due to existing tax 
incentives for the insurer and insured individuals. These 
incentives have been modified several times since the setup of 
additional voluntary pension insurance. Despite the incentives, 
however, the number of insured individuals shows a 
negligible growth rate; 
2) The money accumulated in the individual accounts of 
future retirees in the different funds differ substantially. Under 
occupational schemes with voluntary pension insurance funds 
their total amount is BGN 4,975,000 as at 30 September 2012 
or 0.83% of the net assets of the two funds. This significant 
difference in the amount of net assets can be explained by the 
fact that only one such pension scheme currently operates 
under one of the pension insurance companies – POK “DSK 
Rodina” AD;  
3) Similar to additional mandatory pension insurance 
diversified investment portfolios have been set up for 
voluntary pension insurance under occupational schemes as 
well.  
4) One of the shortcomings of the existing system for 
additional voluntary pension insurance is the limitation by the 
employer of the right of the employee to use the funds 
accumulated in their individual account prior to the date of 
retirement.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The conducted analysis demonstrates the failure to follow a 
systematic approach in the organization and management of 
the pension system. Reforms remain partial and inconsistent at 
best and serve to distort the entire course of its development. 
With regard to the specific insurance model, it should retain 
its present overall structure. The capital (private account) 
element as a component of the income of pensioners should be 
strengthened. The calls for full privatization of the pension 
system are untenable. In the case of Chile, the outcome was 
rather controversial. 
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